Several recent papers propose competing theoretical explanations for the empirical observation of an inverted U-shape relationship between enviromental degradation and per-capita income. We proprose the following test of the theory: calibrate the theoretical model to an already developed economy using information unrelated to the pollution-income curve. Then simulate the model starting from a less developed initial condition and compare the predicted pollution-income relationship with that in the data. Our results are mixed. Some support exists for the theory that the inverted Ushape results from a corner solution in which less developed countries do not abate any pollution. However, pollution peaks at a level of per capita income that is sometimes much higher than that observed in the data.
Introduction
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) theory investigates the relationship between environmental degradation and economic development. For a handful of pollutants, the empirical literature (Grossman and Krueger (1995) , Selden and Song (1994) , Stern and Common ¤ We would like to thank seminar participants at the University of Central Florida and the University of Miami.
(2001), among others)¯nds an inverted U-shape: pollution levels rise and then fall with increasing income. Theoretical models such as John and Pecchenino (1994) , Kelly (2003) , and Stokey (1998) prove the existence of a U-shaped Kuznets curve, given a set of reasonable assumptions. As of yet, however, there has been no bridge between the theoretical and empirical models. Thus, the purpose of this research is to link theoretical results with empirical regularities through the calibration and simulation of a growth model with emissions as a factor of production and environmental quality as a normal good.
The use of calibration to analyze the pollution-income relationship has some advantages. In particular, calibration requires only data from a developed economy. Thus we avoid missing or low quality data in developing countries, and do not have to worry about country speci¯c e®ects that might be present if the model were instead estimated using data from a panel of countries. Further, our calibration exercise is a direct test of a theoretical model (as well as a test of the idea that the EKC arises from a corner solution in which countries initially choose a corner solution with no pollution abatement). Therefore, unlike most empirical papers, we directly test a model without using reduced-form equations, which obscure exactly how and why the EKC occurs. Finally, our results provide some guidance to empirical research. Small changes in empirical speci¯cation can produce widely di®ering estimates of the income level where emissions peak. Our model predicts an emissions peak at an income level more consistent with more recent empirical papers, which predict emissions peak at a relatively high income level.
The use of calibration is not without disadvantages. We can predict the per capita income at which emissions peak, but have no standard errors for this prediction. However, our purpose is not to estimate the income at which emissions peak, but rather to test the theory by calculating, given parameter values that imply the model matches other features of the data, the emissions peak predicted by the model. If the theory predicts an emissions peak reasonably close to that in the data, we have evidence in favor of the theory. If not, we gain insights as to where the current theory needs improvement.
Finally, this paper is of general interest in that we provide one of the few rigorous calibrations of a model of growth and the environment. All parameters are calibrated so that the model matches a variety of long run average features of the data. Thus the theory is consistent with the data in a way that simple numerical examples of theoretical models generally are not. We hence provide a framework for a more rigorous test of theoretical environmental economics models at the national level. Rather than ask if a numerical example exists that is analytically consistent with observed facts (for some parameters, the model has an EKC), the test we propose asks if a numerical example consistent with a variety of features of the data generates also the observed fact in question (for a particular set of parameters, the model has an EKC which peaks at a point reasonably close to that in the data). Levinson and Israel (2003) provide the only other existing direct test of the theory. They use the World Values Survey, a poll of about 70,000 residents in 48 countries to ascertain marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a clean environment. Due to the qualitative nature of their data, Levinson and Israel focus on whether the patterns of willingness to pay conform to those predicted by John and Pecchenino (1994) and Stokey (1998) . They¯nd conclusive evidence that MWTP declines with GDP per capita in rich countries, seeming to suggest that if MWTP has decreased, the environment must have already improved. They also reveal some semblance of a peak in MWTP, implying that a high level of environmental degradation is correlated with the peak in MWTP (if the environment is bad, people care more about abatement). However, their analysis is limited by low quality survey data.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we provide a list of theoretical assumptions and empirical regularities. Next, we develop our model. We calibrate the model with emissions data on¯ve sets of pollutants that display empirical EKC tendencies. We computationally examine the resulting shape of the pollution-income curve. Although we¯nd some existence of a EKC relationship, for most pollutants we¯nd that emissions peak at an income level higher than that in the data.
Empirical Regularities and Stylized Facts
We examine the following ambient pollutants: sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, volatile organic compounds, hydrocarbons, and airborne lead. We choose these pollutants based on the availability of cost data. Sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) is a corrosive acid gas that combines with water vapor to form acid rain. It is emitted largely through fossil fuel use in electricity generation and home heating and through the smelting of nonferrous ores. Emissions have been correlated with the damage of vegetation, watercourses and building structures. SO 2 in ambient air is also associated with asthma and chronic bronchitis.
Carbon monoxide (CO) is a toxic gas emitted into the atmosphere through combustion processes. Carbon monoxide exposure leads to the reduction in the ability of the circulatory system to transport oxygen, which causes impairment of performance on tasks requiring vigilance, as well as the aggravation of cardiovascular disease.
Nitrogen oxides are formed from the oxidation of nitrogen, which occurs during hightemperature combustion. The principal source of nitrogen oxides{nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), collectively known as NO x {is road tra±c. Other important sources include power stations, heating plants and industrial processes. NO x is a respiratory irritant that contributes to acid rain as well as the ground-level ozone problem.
PM 10 particulates, airborne particulates of very small size (<10 ¹m), can penetrate deep into the lungs and thus potentially pose signi¯cant health risks such as increased probability of heart and lung disease. A principal source of PM 10 is road tra±c emissions, particularly from diesel vehicles.
Hydrocarbons and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are emitted during fuel combustion, primarily as unburned fuels or as combustion products. In addition, VOCs are released from the evaporation of solvents and motor fuels. Some VOCs are known carcinogens, while others lead to the formation of ozone.
Lead (Pb) is a cumulative poison to the central nervous system that is of particular detriment to young children. Lead emissions result from activities such as fossil fuel combustion, especially from vehicles. In 1971, the US EPA began to regulate gasoline lead additives; by 1996, the United States imposed an outright ban on leaded gasoline (McGinlay (1987) ).
Empirical tests of the pollution-income relationship show pollutant-speci¯c results for a variety of ambient, water and soil pollutants. For the pollutants with which we are concerned, the consensus is the inverted U-shape. In general, most research in this area entails using¯xed e®ects and random e®ects estimation of quadratic, log-linear, log-quadratic and/or cubic-polynomial pollution-income relationships. Emissions or pollutant concentrations (either urban or national) are regressed on GDP as well as other variables such as time trend, population density and site-related variables. The reduced-form equation adopted by most of the empirical studies is assumed to capture the structural model in which income in°uences technology, the composition of output and environmental policy, and how changes in these factors in turn a®ect environmental pressure. An important issue in the empirical literature is the estimation of the location of the turning point: the income level at which emissions peak.
Grossman and Krueger (1995) estimate a reduced-form relationship between per capita income and various environmental indicators. They use Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) data on sulfur dioxide, heavy particulates and smoke (their classi¯cation for smaller particulates) in a cross-section of urban areas located in 42 countries for SO 2 , 29 countries for heavy particulates, and 19 for smoke. For sulfur dioxide and smoke, they¯nd concentrations exhibit an inverted U-shape with income. The turning point occurs at per capita incomes of $4,900 and $7,400 (1990 USD) respectively. For heavy particulates, however, their regression shows a negative relationship between economic growth and pollutant concentration. Bandopadhyay and Sha¯k (1992) estimate pollution-income curves for ambient levels of sulfur dioxide and suspended particulate matter with a data set of 149 countries. While Grossman and Krueger (1995) use a cubic relationship in income, Bandopadhyay and Sha¯k (1992) employ a polynomial with log income and garner turning points for SO 2 and SPM of $4,441 and $3,969 (1990 USD) respectively. Selden and Song (1994) utilize a cross-national panel of data on suspended particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide. They allege their national emissions data is quantitatively di®erent than urban concentrations data, which is used by Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Bandopadhyay and Sha¯k (1992) . Employing a quadratic pollution-income relationship, Selden and Song (1994) ¯nd that per capita emissions of all four pollutants exhibit inverted-U relationships with per capita income. However, they estimate slightly higher turning point income levels than Grossman and Krueger (1995) (SO 2 , $10,500; NO x , $13,600; SPM $12,500; and CO, $7,200 in 1990 USD). Selden and Song (1994) suggest that this is because ambient pollution concentrations are likely to decline before aggregate emissions, given the population concentrations in cities, the ability to install higher smokestacks, etcetera. Panayotou (1993) provides EKC results for SO 2 , NO x , and SPM. The study employs cross sectional data, and like in Selden and Song (1994) , the three pollutants are measured in terms of emissions per capita on a national basis. For sulfur oxides, the turning point is $5,965 (1990 USD). Hilton and Levinson (1998) estimate the relationship between lead emissions and income. They use a data set of 48 countries over 20 years. For average lead content of gasoline, they use Octel's Worldwide Gasoline Survey, and for total gasoline consumption, they employ various OECD publications. They¯nd an inverted U-shape pollution-income relationship with a peak that is sensitive to both the functional form (polynomial and log-quadratic) and the time period (pre and post 1983). For post 1983, they¯nd a statistically signi¯cant peak of $10,200 (1990 USD). They suggest that the declining portion of the curve depends on reducing gasoline lead content, not gasoline use. That is, the improvement in environmental quality that accompanies income growth depends on the type of regulation and developments that decrease pollution intensity rather than the reduction in pollution activity.
In a much later study, Stern and Common (2001) ask whether the basic EKC model is adequately speci¯ed; i.e., whether the model is subject to omitted variables bias. They use a larger and more globally representative sulfur dioxide sample (31 annual observations on each of 73 developed and developing countries, 30 years of data) than previous sulfur EKC studies. They estimate a logarithmic quadratic EKC for world, OECD and non-OECD samples. They¯nd that the turning point depends on the sample employed; for the OECD countries, $9,239, and for the world, $101,166 (1990 USD).
Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson (2002) also question the speci¯cation of the basic EKC model. They update and clean up the data employed by Grossman and Krueger (1995) ; i.e., their results bene¯t from 10 years of additional observations, more cities, and revisions of some of the original observations. In addition, the authors test the sensitivity of the pollution-income relationship to functional forms, to additional covariates and to changes in the nations, cities and years sampled. They include variables describing national income, political structure, investment, trade and population density, as well as control variables that account for location of monitoring stations. They¯nd the results to be highly sensitive to these changes and conclude that the jury is still out on whether there is su±cient empirical support for an inverted U-shaped relationship. By adding 10 years and 25 cities to Grossman and Krueger (1995)'s data set, Harbaugh et. al.¯nd sulfur dioxide emissions peak at $24,298 (1990 USD). Using this expanded data set and depending on the length of the GDP timelag, explanatory variables, year dummies, structural form, and outlier removal, the authors achieve sulfur dioxide peaks ranging from $22,748 to $79,255 (1990 USD). When they limit their sulfur dioxide sample to countries with income greater than $9,680 (1990 USD), theȳ nd no evidence of the inverted U-shape. They also conducted the same types of regressions for airborne lead and nitrogen oxide. According to Harbaugh, et. al., due to smaller sample sizes, the results were generally less statistically signi¯cant. Yet, airborne lead appears to peak at $17,303 and nitrogen oxides at $6,534 (1990 USD).
Development and the Environment: Theory
As the theory goes, in the¯rst stage of industrialization, people are more interested in eating than in breathing clean air. Communities are too poor to pay for abatement and environmental regulation is correspondingly weak or non-existent. As income rises, industry becomes cleaner and marginal utility of consumption falls, indicating that people value the environment more highly. Also, regulatory institutions become more e®ective. Along the curve, pollution levels o® in the middle-income range and then falls toward pre-industrial levels in wealthy societies.
Thus, according to Dasputa, Laplante, Wang and Wheeler (2002) , certain assumptions must be made to achieve the inverted U-shape. Namely, with an increase in income, there must be constant or falling marginal utility of consumption, rising disutility of pollution, rising marginal damage of pollution, and rising marginal cost of abatement. Also, public agencies must exist that regulate pollution with full information about the bene¯ts and costs of pollution control. Other economists suggest the EKC can be obtained by combining a normal good assumption with an increasingly \cleaner" composition of production and consumption. The cleaner composition arises from increasing levels of education and environmental awareness combined with more open political systems and freer trade (Selden and Song (1994) ).
Kelly (2003), Stokey (1998), and John and Pecchenino (1994) develop theoretical models consistent with the EKC theory. According to Kelly (2003) , the shape of the emissions curve depends on the interplay between marginal costs and bene¯ts of abatement. I.e., if at a given income level, the marginal bene¯ts of pollution control rise more than the marginal costs, the emissions-income relationship has a negative slope at that income level and vice versa. By assuming convexity in costs of emission control, the marginal costs of emissions control rise along the growth path. By modeling environmental quality as a normal good, marginal bene¯ts of emissions control rise with an increase in income.
Both Stokey (1998) and John and Pecchenino (1994) provide models with pollutionincome relationships that are inverted U-shaped, peaking when equilibria switch from corner solutions with zero abatement to interior optima with positive environmental investment. John and Pecchenino (1994) model the pollution-income relationship in an overlappinggenerations framework in which environmental quality is a stock resource. While consumption degrades the environment, investment in the environment by the¯rst generation improves the environment bequeathed to future generations. In Stokey (1998) , pollution is proportional to output, but the proportion can be reduced by a control technology. A \dirty" method of production is used if income is below a critical threshold, while progressively cleaner methods are utilized as income rises above that level. Below the threshold, pollution increases with income. Above the threshold, total pollution depends on the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption goods. For an elasticity greater than one, the model has an inverted-U pollution-income curve. An increase in income raises consumption, which reduces the marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, the marginal bene¯t of emissions (increased consumption via increased production) falls. Further, pollution is proportional to income and utility is convex in pollution, so an increase in income raises the marginal costs of pollution.
Model
The model is a generalization of Kelly (2003) , which allows for exogenous labor-augmenting and pollution-reducing technological change.
The population of L t identical households have preferences over end-of-the-period environmental quality N t+1 , consumption Ct L t , and leisure equal to one less hours worked h t in each period. Capital letters denote aggregate quantities. Preferences are given by the utility function:
We use the Hansen (1985) indivisible labor assumption, which implies linear aggregate disutility of labor. A particular issue is the assumption that utility is separable in consump-tion, leisure and environmental quality. Strong complementarity between consumption and environmental quality would tend to make environmental quality more appealing at high incomes, when consumption and leisure are highest, and less appealing at low incomes.
1
A CRS technology exists that produces gross output Q t from capital K t and productivity augmented total hours h t L t A t . Here A t is the level of technology, which grows exogenously at rate Á. Population grows at rate´. The production technology is:
Unabated pollution is a proportion
is the emissions intensity of output. We assume B t grows exogenously at rate´+ Á(1 +´).
2 Let u t denote the fraction of emissions abated, then emissions, E t , is:
The cost of emissions abatement is C (u t ) Q t . Hence output net of abatement costs, Y t , is:
We assume a convex cost function:
Using Equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) to substitute out for Q t and u t implies net production is Cobb-Douglas:
Here µ = Ã (1 ¡ ") is the capital share and " can thus be interpreted as the emissions share. Let capital depreciate at rate ± k . The resource constraint then sets consumption plus net investment equal to production net of abatement costs:
Environmental quality is a decreasing function ¡ of the stock of pollution, M t :
Because the total hours worked input increases as the population increases, the productivity of emissions must rise to balance the use of the labor input and the emissions input BE.
Since E is stationary, B must grow at the rate of output. We assume the pollution concentration decays at a constant rate ± m . Therefore the stock of pollution accumulates according to:
The objective function of the social planner is to maximize lifetime utility of all households:
The problem can be normalized with economic variables written in per productivity unit terms.
and similarly for c t and y t and let^=¯(1 +´) < 1. Then the social planning problem is:
Subject to:
The recursive version of the problem is:
The maximization is subject to (13). In addition, maximum and minimum emissions exist corresponding to u = 0 and u = 1:
If u = 0, we have a corner solution with no abatement and maximum emissions,
, so the non-negativity constraint on abatement given by Equation (14), is binding.
Calibration

Data
In contrast to the empirical studies, we focus solely on data from developed countries. Since we want an \out-of-sample" test of the EKC theory, we exclude developing countries as we don't calibrate to the observed pollution-income curve. As we require cost data, it is convenient to use US data. Our environmental cost data is harvested from the EPA's \Envi-ronmental Investments: The Cost of a Clean Environment." This cost data is attractive for our purpose as it divides spending by pollutant category. The major pitfall, however, is there are no reports after 1990, so the compliance costs for years 1991-1998 are from the EPA's estimates. The categories include: (1) particulates, (2) sulfur oxides, (3) nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide, (4) lead, and (5) hydrocarbons and volatile organic compounds. We classify pollutants into categories in line with this cost data. We use US national emissions data from 1980-1998. For dual categories, since we cannot disaggregate the cost data, we simply aggregate the total emissions of the pollutants in question. We also calibrate using sulfur permit price data, gleaned from the EPA's annual progress report on acid rain compliance. Atmospheric depreciation rates are garnered from air pollution textbooks (Stern (1976) and Stern, Boubel, Turner and Fox (1984) ). Economic data is from well-used sources: US Dept. of Commerce, the Federal Reserve, and Bureau of Labor Statistics. All sources are in the Reference Section.
Assignment of Functional Forms Consistent With The Data
We have already speci¯ed utility, cost, and production functions. Thus it remains only to specify the relationship between pollution and environmental quality. Let c M denote the maximum sustainable pollution stock. We assume an a±ne relationship between pollution and environmental quality:
We then have:
Assignment of Model Parameters
The model has a particular advantage in that many of the calibrated economic parameters may be chosen independent of the utility function, and therefore independent of the environmental side of the economy. Hence most of the economic parameters are calibrated in an identical manner to the previous literature (see for example, Cooley and Prescott (1995) ).
In general, we choose the parameters to match certain long run average features of the data. Importantly, we do not use the observed dynamic relationship between emissions and income in the data to calibrate any of the parameters, since we are testing this aspect of the model. We calibrate the rate of growth in population so that the rate of growth in population in the model economy matches the average rate of growth in population in the data over the sample period. Similarly, the rate of growth in technology is chosen so that the steady state rate of growth in per capita output in the model economy matches the average rate of growth in per capita output in the data. We de¯ne investment, X , as:
Since in the steady state investment, output, and capital all grow at the same rate, the steady state investment to capital ratio, X K , is:
Using (15), we choose ± k so that the model economy matches the investment to capital ratio of the data. Let ½ = 1¡¯b e the pure rate of time preference. The¯rst order condition for optimal investment at the steady state is then:
Equation (16) implies µ is the share of income accruing to capital owners since the left hand side is the return on capital. Let I t denote capital income, then we choose µ = I Y , so that the share of income accruing to capital owners in the model matches the average share of income accruing to capital owners in the data. Then using (16), ½ is chosen so that the steady state capital to output ratio in the model economy matches the data. We thus assign the parameters ½, Á,´, ± k , and µ using the standard technique of Cooley and Prescott (1995) , which does not require use of environmental data. Table I gives the calibrated values economic parameters.
We use scienti¯c studies to calculate the rate of decay of the stock of pollution, ± m . We classify pollutants which survive in the atmosphere for less than a year as°ows (± m = 1). Particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, lead and volatile organic compounds all last in the atmosphere for less than a week. Carbon monoxide has an atmospheric residence time of one to three months. Hydrocarbons have a residence time of 16 years. Since we cannot separate the spending on VOCs and hydrocarbons, we use an average residence time of eight years. Table 3 gives the calibrated values of ± m .
Two alternatives exist for the calibration of the emissions share, ". Ideally, the emissions share may be identi¯ed using observed tax rates or permit prices if the government uses a market-based regulation instrument. Let the tax rate per unit of emissions (or alternatively the price of a tradable permit that allows one unit of emissions) be ¿, then optimal¯rm behavior implies the marginal product of emissions equals the tax rate (or permit price):
Equation (17) implies:
Hence we choose " so that the share of income spent on emissions taxes (or emissions permits) equals the average share of income spent on emissions permits or taxes in the data.
It is important to note we use only data from a developed economy at the steady state to calculate ". In the transitional dynamics, changes in the marginal product of emissions as the country develops is important for the shape of the EKC (see Kelly (2003) ). However, the calibration uses only output data from a fully developed economy, so " is not chosen to match the EKC in any way. Unfortunately among the pollutants in the data only SO 2 regulation is market-based. For the remaining pollutants (and SO 2 for comparison) we use EPA environmental compliance cost data to calibrate the emissions share. Combining Equations (3) and (5) gives:
Hence:
Note that since B grows at the same rate as output and emissions is stationary, BE=Y is stationary. Given an emissions to output ratio BE=Y , we set " so that long run average environmental compliance spending in the model matches long run average compliance cost spending in the data. We let subscripts on functions denote derivatives. The¯rst order condition for optimal emissions at the steady state is:
Equation (19) equates the marginal bene¯ts and marginal costs of emissions at the steady state. We therefore set ® so that steady state emissions in the model matches long run average emissions in the data. The¯rst order condition for optimal hours worked at the steady state is:°=
The fraction of time spent working we use is h = 0:31 (Cooley and Prescott (1995) ). We therefore calibrate°so that the steady state consumption to output ratio matches the long run average consumption to output ratio in the data. Since " is small,°varies little across pollutants and is close to the calibrated value in a model without pollution. We have thus chosen nine parameters to match various features of a developed country, the US. Five parameters are chosen independent of the environmental data altogether. One parameter is chosen from scienti¯c studies. The disutility of labor is approximately independent of the environmental data. The emissions share of production and the share of environmental quality in the composite consumption good are derived using only data from a developed economy and are in fact chosen to match the long run emissions and environmental compliance spending data of a developed economy. An interesting question is the prediction of the model for transition economies, which we turn to next.
Results
The model was solved using the method of Kelly and Kolstad (1999) , which computes non-linear approximations of the value function and decision rules E(k; M ), k 0 (k; M ), and h(k; M ). Per capita income in the empirical literature corresponds to income prior to abatement spending, q =
Hence the decision rule may be written as
For the°ow pollutant categories, particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides/carbon monoxide, and lead, the decisions are independent of M . Therefore the pollution-income curve E(q) measures emissions as a function of income and has the same general shape as E(k) and therefore the same shape as the pollution-income relationship generated from time series data starting from a less-developed initial condition (k 0 equal to a small positive number). For the stock pollutant category hydrocarbons and VOCs, the e®ect of an increase in income on emissions (or the end of the period pollution stock M 0 ) varies with M , so we report the emissions-income curve for several values of M . We also report the stock of pollution versus income relationship generated from time series data starting from less developed initial conditions (k 0 and M 0 small but positive).
All of our pollutant categories exhibit increasing and then decreasing levels of emissions as income increases, suggesting an inverted-U relationship (see Figures 1-8 , all¯gures are in the Appendix). More speci¯cally, for su±ciently low incomes (low capital stocks), our model gives a corner solution. That is, when income is low, no abatement exists. The planner prefers to set abatement equal to zero in order to increase output and thus increase consumption. Hence, the constraint that emissions cannot exceed emissions with zero abatement, Equation (14), binds. The level of emissions is as high as possible to achieve the greatest level of output given technology and the available amount of capital and labor. The maximum emissions is concave and increasing in capital. Thus, with more capital, production increases and the constraint becomes less stringent. Then, as capital stock increases past a certain level, abatement rises above zero and emissions decline.
Although we garner some semblance of an inverted U-shape, the downward turn occurs after the steady state for four of¯ve pollutant categories and at too large an income level for all pollutant categories when compared to the early empirical research (Table 4) . Most empirical studies show emissions peak at some middle income range, which is close to, or in most cases, well before steady state income. We de¯ne steady state per capita income as the average per capita income of developed countries.
4 The literature suggests peaks for sulfur oxides ranging from 32% to 75% of steady state income, while we have a peak occurring after our steady state (135%) for both the calibration using permit price data and the calibration using environmental compliance spending. However, Stern and Common (2001) has the peak at 721% of steady state income and Harbaugh et al. (2002) estimate a peak between 162% to 565% of steady state income. Particulate emissions peak at 187% of steady state income, while the econometricians calculate a downward turn between 53% and 89%. For the nitrogen/carbon monoxide category, we¯nd a peak before the steady state, at 94% of steady state income. Selden and Song (1994) report a value of 97% for nitrogen oxides. However, since we grouped nitrogen oxides with carbon monoxide, our lower value is probably partially due to the e®ect of carbon monoxide, for which Selden and Song (1994) report a peak of approximately 51% of steady state income. Harbaugh, et. al. (2002) nd a substantially lower value for nitrogen oxide at 47%. For airborne lead, we obtain a peak at 124%, extremely close to the peak at 123% estimated by Harbaugh, et. al. (2002) . Hilton and Levinson (1998) estimate a peak for airborne lead at 73% of steady state income. Volatile organic compounds are a stock pollutant, so several de¯nitions of the emissionsincome curve exist, depending on the preexisting stock of pollution (see Kelly (2003) for a discussion). If we¯x the stock at a high level, such as 0.97 (with 1 being the maximum), we garner a peak at 97%. If we have a low stock of VOCs, for example, M = :04, we¯nd an always increasing emissions-income curve. If we¯x the stock at a middle range, such as 0.55, we obtain at a peak at 138% of steady state income. If we let M 0 and K 0 be small and we plot the time path of M versus income, then the stock of pollution versus income curve is always increasing. Presumably, the stock of pollution versus income curve is conceptually most close to the empirical literature, which generally uses the stock of pollution.
The inconsistency of our results with that of the empiricists is not an issue of the mathematical validity of our steady state; if we relax the constraint which requires abatement to be non-negative, our relationship between emissions and capital stock hits the steady state values in all cases.
Sensitivity Analysis
Here we do sensitivity analysis to check robustness of the results and to gain information about what parameters most a®ect the peak emissions. Each row of Table 5 is a simulation which holds all variables constant at the value determined by the particulates calibration were included in both the samples of Stern and Common (2001) and Selden and Song (1994) . We calculated an average of $14,040 (1990 USD) using Summers and Heston (1991) , which is the data set utilized by most of the empirical studies.
except the given parameter. The critical value is the value of the given parameter which results in an emissions peak within the range of the early empirical studies, about 50% of the steady state capital stock for particulates. Most of the parameters have little e®ect on the emissions peak. The consumption share ® and emissions share " are clearly the most important parameters, since these a®ect the central trade o® between environmental quality and consumption. A lower ® means the marginal utility of consumption is not as high in low income countries, which causes emissions to peak earlier. A lower " means the marginal product of emissions is smaller, decreasing the incentive to emit at low incomes and thus causing emissions to peak earlier. However, it is important to note that reducing ® and " also cause the steady state emissions to fall. If we change ® or " so that the model predicts an emissions peak of 50% of the steady state capital stock, then the model predicts steady state emissions that are 97% or 75% below levels observed in the US data, respectively.
Drastically lowering the capital share reduces the incentive to save, freeing up income to spend on emissions reduction. If we let µ = 0:04 the model predicts an emissions peak equal to 50% of the steady state capital stock. Of course in this case in the steady state capital owners receive 4% share of income, which is inconsistent with the US data. Finally, reducing preferences for leisure increase working and therefore income. The extra income when spent on consumption reduces the marginal utility of consumption early in development, which in turn reduces incentives to emit. However, to get an emissions peak equal to 50% of the steady state capital stock requires workers to spend all non-personal time working at all stages of development which is inconsistent with the US data.
To examine interaction e®ects among the parameters, we randomly select a sample of parameter vectors from an assumed distribution, solve the model for each parameter vector, and calculate the emissions peak. We then compute statistics from the resulting emissions peak data. To keep the computations manageable, we allow only the three parameters which most strongly a®ect the emissions peak, ®, ", and µ, to vary. We assume a very conservative distribution for each parameter. We assume µ is between 0.25 and 0.4, and ® and " are such that the upper bound is the baseline value and the lower bound is the value which results in steady state emissions 50% below current US levels when all other parameters are held at their baseline values. Thus: We ran 20 total simulations, the results of which are summarized in Table 6 . We can reject the hypothesis that the emissions peak is less than or equal to 50% of the steady state capital stock given the assumed parameter uncertainty with 95% con¯dence. We therefore conclude that the results of the model are robust to reasonable parameter uncertainty.
Conclusions/Implications
Our results show increasing and then decreasing pollution emissions as income rises. At rst, abatement is equal to zero. People are more interested in eating than environmental quality. Then, as the constraint ceases to bind, preferences for environmental quality comes into play. If we remove the requirement that abatement must be non-negative, we¯nd a decidedly negative relationship between income and emissions. We can prove theoretically that this is the case (see Appendix). As in Figure 9 , if negative abatement were possible, agents would pollute more (negative abatement) at very low levels of income and then decrease emissions as incomes rise.
The fact that abatement is initially equal to zero (a corner solution) is in accord with Stokey (1998) . However, our model gives peak emissions well after steady state income; hence, it predicts that developing countries would not abate, period. They would eventually reach a steady state capital stock, which is well within the no abatement range for sulfur oxides, particulates, and lead.
We conjecture three possible explanations for our deviation from some of the empirical results. The¯rst is that some bene¯t exists to pollution control at middle to high incomes that is not being captured by our model. Perhaps consumption and leisure are more complementary to environmental quality than our separable utility function and indivisible labor assumption imply. Since consumption and leisure are increasing functions of capital and therefore income, to model strong complementarity would make the slope of the unconstrained pollution income curve more negative. Decreasing the slope of unconstrained emissions would have no e®ect on emissions at low incomes, which are constrained, but would reduce emissions below the constraint at higher incomes, thus reducing the income at which emissions peak. Another preference related explanation is that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is such that environmental quality is less substitutable over time than logarithmic utility implies (that is the coe±cient of risk aversion is greater than one, as in Stokey (1998) ). Still, experiments with coe±cients of risk aversion of 2 produce similar results, indicating that the results are robust at least for small changes to the curvature of the utility function.
The second is that the technology is misspeci¯ed; that is, the emissions that result when abatement is equal to zero is higher than that given in our model. We chose our abatement cost function so that income net of abatement costs is a Cobb-Douglas function of capital, emissions, and hours. A di®erent function that increases emissions at zero abatement but does not greatly increase unconstrained emissions would reduce the emissions peak.
A more favorable interpretation of the results is that the reduced-form emissions-income regression employed in the early empirical studies is misspeci¯ed. Some validity for this argument is shown in that Stern and Common (2001) and Harbaugh et al. (2002) estimate peaks well after steady state through expanding the sample size, cleaning up the data, and adding other explanatory variables. Our results certainly are more in line with these later empirical results. Finally, our model assumes emissions are stationary. Given the decrease in emissions over the past twenty years even in developed countries, perhaps a better choice is to assume the rate of decline in emissions intensity is larger. However, this implies that research and development which increases the productivity of emissions would continue despite returns to innovation that are much lower than innovations which increase the productivity of labor.
Thus our model at worst provides guidance to the theoretical EKC literature by showing that existing models predict that emissions peak at per capita incomes which are high relative to some empirical studies, or at best provides support for the newer empirical results that indicate that peak emissions are higher than previously thought.
Tables and Figures
Calibrated Values
Parameter Value (1980-98 Table 6 : Sensitivity Analysis. Statistics are from a data set of emissions peaks as a percentage of the steady state capital stock.
Theoretical Analysis of Pollution-Income Relationship
In this appendix, we show theoretically that, for the°ow case, unconstrained emissions are decreasing in the capital stock, and hence that unconstrained pollution decreases as a country develops. We then establish how the constraint changes with the capital stock to establish the theoretical pollution-income curve. The results use the supermodularity results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . First, let s 0 = (1 ¡ ±)k ¡ (1 +´) (1 + Á) k 0 , then the optimization problem is to maximize:
Let k m and E m denote the maximum sustainable capital and pollution stocks, and let Let x = [E; h; s 0 ]. De¯ne a set T as the set of all sustainable capital stocks, T = [0; k m ], and X as the set of all sustainable hours, the negative of all feasible capital stocks, and emissions:
Then T is a partially ordered set and X is a lattice under the component-wise ordering¸. Notice that we are considering the unconstrained problem only and thus do not consider constraints on maximum and minimum emissions, other than sustainability. The next step is to show the optimization problem is sub-modular. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) establish that H is sub modular as a function of fE; h; s 0 g if and only if the cross partial derivatives are all negative. We have:
The above inequality holds since consumption is less than income. Hence H is sub modular. It remains to show that H has decreasing di®erences in k. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show that H has decreasing di®erences if and only if the cross partial derivatives with respect to the decision variables and k are negative. We have:
Here the last inequality holds since consumption is less than wealth. Finally,
Hence H has decreasing di®erences. Therefore, E, h, and s 0 are all decreasing functions of k.
Equation (14) implies:
Since h is a decreasing function of k, the emissions bound may be increasing or decreasing for a given k. However, ub(0) = 0 and f h (k; E; 0) = 1 implies ub(k) > 0 for k > 0. Since the upper bound is a continuous function, it follows that there exists a e k > 0 such that ub(k) is increasing in k over the interval [0; e k]. Unconstrained emissions are decreasing and non-negative, and the upper bound on emissions is increasing for k su±ciently small and satis¯es ub(0) = 0. Hence the constrained optimal pollution-capital curve cannot be strictly decreasing. If unconstrained emissions are everywhere greater than the upper bound, the pollution-capital curve is increasing. If unconstrained emissions drop below the upper bound, then the pollution-capital curve will be an inverted-U shape with abatement equal to zero over some interval of capital stocks [0; k], as in John and Pecchenino (1994) and Stokey (1998) . Figure 9 depicts these results for the particulates case. The upper bound is increasing and concave, and the unconstrained emissions eventually drop below the upper bound, creating the inverted-U shape. 
